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SUBJECT: (Optional)

DCI Task Force Report on Intelligence Production

FROM:

C/IMG/OIT

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

14 February 1992

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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Please circulate as widely as possible and provide Jenny with a rough count of the number of readers. Thanks.

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ER 92-0160/2

15 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM:

Executive Secretary

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SUBJECT: DCI Task Force Report on Intelligence  
Production

1. In keeping with the DCI's commitment to increase openness at CIA, the final reports of the various DCI task forces will be made available for employee review and comment by the Deputy Directors, Independent Office heads, office directors, and DO division chiefs as they are completed. Additional copies will be available for review and comment in the Offices of the Deputy Director for Planning and Coordination (7D59 OHB), the Special Assistant to the DCI, (7D60 OHB), and the Executive Secretary (7E09 OHB). The reports will be available for five working days after they are completed. The DCI will not make any decisions regarding the task forces' recommendations until the expiration of time for employee input. Any employee comments on the task force reports should be sent directly to the DCI or his Special Assistant in 7D60 OHB.

2. The subject matter attached report is provided for employee review and comment. Please remind your employees to provide any comments on this report through the close of business Thursday, 23 January in the manner described above.

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Attachment

Unclassified when Detached  
from Distribution Page  
and Attachment

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NESA 002/92  
14 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Chairman, DI Task Force on  
Intelligence Production

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SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Intelligence  
Production

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REFERENCE: Memo for DDI fr DCI, dtd 18 Nov 91,  
Same Subject

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1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendations contained in the report of the DCI Task Force on Intelligence Production provided at Tab A.

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2. Background: On 18 November 1991, you requested that the DDI form a Task Force to examine how to "...increase the value and reduce the volume of intelligence provided to policy consumers..." while ensuring that the intelligence base be maintained. (Tasking at Tab B) Task Force members (Tab C) interviewed some 60 policymakers from Assistant Secretaries to Country Desk Chiefs in most foreign policymaking departments and agencies, including some agencies not traditionally viewed as intelligence consumers. The result of these interviews combined with the preliminary report of the 1991 Consumer Survey conducted by the Intelligence Producers Council formed the backdrop for our deliberations. Task Force members then formed several working groups to evaluate consumer views, examine current publications, consider alternative products, review dissemination procedures, discuss management and education requirements and consider associated future issues.

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3. In sum, the Task Force recommends that six DI finished intelligence "products" be replaced by two--the Intelligence Memorandum and the Intelligence Research Report; that routine responsibility for review and preparation of the Intelligence Memorandum reside in the

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SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Intelligence Production

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production offices (much as with Typescript Memoranda currently); that Intelligence Research Papers be issued in two parts--a Key Findings edition for senior policymakers and a full text version for other consumers; that each DI production office be required to trim dissemination lists and more importantly to develop an "action plan" to reach key consumers more effectively; that analyst and manager training programs be emended to include greater emphasis on briefing and other means to reach key consumers; and that DI managers take action to ensure that analysts engaged in all forms of DI finished intelligence production are appropriately recognized in Career Service Panel discussions.

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4. In developing these recommendations, the Task Force focused on those actions that can be taken in the near future. Aware of the National Security Review 29 requirement that you respond to a forthcoming statement by policy departments and agencies of their intelligence information and support needs to the year 2005, however, the Task Force working group on associated issues discussed several factors that over the next few years could affect how DI products are produced and disseminated. A short summary of these discussions is provided at Tab D rather than in the Task Force Report.

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5. In its deliberations, the Task Force did not consider the production of current intelligence both in the interest of time and because the recommendations of other Task Forces could conceivably affect those efforts more directly. Neither did the Task Force consider finished intelligence production outside the DI; if the Task Force recommendations are approved, it may be useful for other finished intelligence producers to conduct a similar review.

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#### Attachments:

- A. Report of DCI Task Force on Intelligence Production
- B. DCI Memo to DDI
- C. DCI Task Force Members
- D. Associated Issues

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[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Intelligence Production

[REDACTED]

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Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - ExReg

1 - DDI

1 - ADDI

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[REDACTED]

(14 Jan 92)

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## Report of DCI Task Force on Intelligence Production

### INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER VIEWS

Consumers of the finished intelligence produced by the Directorate of Intelligence highly value the support they receive, rely on a wide-ranging mix of DI products--including "data rich" research papers, policy-relevant memoranda, and tailored oral briefings--and at the same time believe our services should be changed and improved in some areas. The preliminary results of the 1991 Consumer Survey conducted by the Intelligence Producers Council and interviews by the Task Force members of some 60 consumers representing officials at most levels of responsibility in policymaking departments and agencies suggest ways to improve the intelligence production process as well as to enhance current dissemination practices.

Consumer comments focus on several attributes of DI analysis as follows:

Timeliness. Most consumers believe this is the most important hallmark of DI products but note that timeliness is sometimes a problem. Some consumers suggest the DI:

- Produce more short, fast-turnaround reports, including Situation Reports, Spot Commentaries, and Alert Memorandums.
- Create easier or more identifiable ways for consumers to ask and get quick answers to questions.
- Increase the use of secure fax machines to send material that is needed fast.

Substantive Content. DI consumers unanimously stress quality of content as the most important attribute for intelligence analysis after timeliness. The DI is valued for its expertise, objectivity and ability to devote time to deepening the US Government's understanding of foreign situations and trends. Beyond this consensus, there are many views of what is most valuable in our work and where we can make improvements. For example:

- Papers more narrowly focused on a single issue rather than a range of issues are most valuable to some consumers.

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- Estimative papers draw praise from other consumers especially when such papers contain judgments clearly derived from intelligence, warnings about new problems or emerging trends, discussion of opportunities, clarification of alternative views, or identification of what is not known in a situation.
- Papers that synthesize large amounts of information from intelligence and non-intelligence sources are preferred by other consumers.
- Papers that simplify complex or technical subjects--for example, in the realm of economics or technology--are viewed as vital by some.

Formats. Virtually all consumers were unable to distinguish among the various DI written formats and frankly do not really care. Most DI formats--"hardcovers" of various sorts, typescripts, periodicals and new artforms--were mentioned favorably by some. Although consumers decidedly indicated that product value is determined more by content than format, some aspects of how we present information does matter:

- DI graphics and maps--particularly thematic maps--are praised and retained by many consumers.
- Informative headings, the use of boldtype and clear, logical organization are praised for making DI products easy to use.
- Reference Aid-type products are valued for organizing information and data with a long shelf life.

Length. Brevity and conciseness are valued, but tolerance for longer papers depends partly on the individual consumer and partly on the subject of a paper. Some consumers also liked the idea of selective oral briefings on particularly timely papers or issues.

- Most consumers at the Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary level said they could only read very short papers, typically under five pages; they prefer even shorter executive summaries or key findings; some like the idea of receiving an executive summary with the option to request the full backup paper.

- Country desk directors and key staff aides read papers of any length focusing on issues of relevance to them. Some of these consumers worry that the depth and quality of our support could decline if brevity is over emphasized.
- Still others--particularly in the Department of Defense and the military commands--want maximum detail in analysis and information, relying on the DI to provide data-rich products with lengthy shelf lives.

The Task Force also found the following, more general comments noteworthy:

- Most consumers stated that they receive far too many papers not relevant to their needs.
- Most policymakers are satisfied with the way the community anticipates and keeps pace with their changing policy concerns, but 34 percent note some lag.
- Most policymakers feel they have an excellent relationship with intelligence people and staffs. Those who are not satisfied with Intelligence Community support lack close ties or liaison contacts.

With these consumer reactions as a backdrop, the Intelligence Production Task Force focused on the following:

- Finished Intelligence Products
- Dissemination
- Management and education\*

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\* The Intelligence Production Task Force did not consider the production of current intelligence both in the interest of time and because the recommendations of other Task Forces could conceivably affect those efforts more directly. Neither did the Task Force consider finished intelligence production outside the Directorate of Intelligence.



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## FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

## Current Realities

The DI produces a wide range of written materials including:

- Six major categories of monographs--Research Papers (RPs), Reference Aids (RAs), Intelligence Assessments (IAs), Technical Intelligence Reports (TIRs), Imagery Analysis Reports (IARs), and Typescript Memorandums. Some 1,200 to 1,400 of these items are produced annually.
- A weekly publication--the International Economic & Energy Weekly--that is the flagship serial intelligence publication on economic and energy issues.
- Serial publications produced by most DI offices.
- Biographic reports, some 7,000 to 9,000 of which are prepared annually largely in response to short deadlines set by policymakers.

In addition, each DI office has developed a wide range of highly-focused, tailored and policy-relevant "non-traditional" or ad hoc products. These are designed either to anticipate or to respond quickly to policymakers' concerns. They routinely are produced on office-controlled desktop publishing systems and are disseminated directly by the producing office. These products include:

- "Blind memorandums" on an extremely broad range of issues and questions raised by consumers.
- Situation Reports, for example the weekly UN Iraq Resolutions Monitoring Report prepared by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
- "Nonpapers," a question-and-answer format developed particularly by the Office of East Asian Analysis.
- "Morning Summaries" such as the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Morning Summary of Terrorist Threats.
- "Overnight Developments," such as those begun in December 1990 by the then Office of Soviet Analysis.

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- Newsletters like the Office of African and Latin American Analysis' monthly Cuba Trends, The Mexico Free Trade Update, and The South Africa Negotiations Monitor.
- A cluster of publications of various periodicities dealing with events in the former USSR, such as the Chronicles: A Monthly Report on the Baltic States and the Soviet Republics.

Every DI production office provides oral briefings for policymakers to some extent. The number of briefings given to policymakers annually is unavailable, but across the DI, about 500 Congressional briefings and nearly 700 foreign liaison briefings were given in FY 1990; about 400 briefings for Congress and some 600 liaison briefings were given in FY 1991.

The Task Force's review of today's production realities also found:

- A marked decrease in turnaround time by the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support for the publication of hardcover papers once ORCON clearances are received. Research Papers and Reference Aids on average now are published in about 14 working days compared with nearly 20 in 1986; Intelligence Assessments are routinely published in about 11 days compared with about 16 five years ago. CPAS also rapidly produces sophisticated graphics packages that, in the view of many consumers, enhance DI research papers.
- The increased use of the Situation Report format--either in current intelligence or in typescript memorandum form--to deal with fast-breaking events around the world; at the same time a general lack of understanding was noted within the DI regarding the threshold for use of Spot Commentaries.
- The increased use of the Typescript Memorandum to convey basic intelligence.
- A blurring of the distinction within the DI between many Intelligence Assessments and Research Papers and between many Research Papers and Reference Aids.

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### Proposals to Enhance DI Production

In discussing alternative approaches to DI finished intelligence production, the Task Force found the following compelling:

- Timeliness is crucial.
- Most consumers receive too much material.
- Although most consumers cannot differentiate among the various types of DI publications, those publications cited as most useful represent opposite ends of the finished intelligence continuum, that is the short, timely products--including briefings--that are tailored to individual consumers and the in-depth, data-rich research papers.
- The expertise needed to produce short turnaround, predictive analysis is most reliably found among analysts who have completed longer-term research on an issue and who have successfully drafted and coordinated a report on their research findings.

As a result, the Task Force recommends a major enhancement to DI finished intelligence products that would replace the current six products with two--the Intelligence Memorandum and the Intelligence Research Paper.

The Task Force proposes to replace the current Typescript Memorandum and the Intelligence Assessment with the **Intelligence Memorandum**. The Task Force notes that frequently Typescript Memorandums are too lengthy and lack the focus that would ensure that they are read. Likewise, many Intelligence Assessments are too long, too late and too burdened by data to be the best vehicle for alerting senior consumers to a problem or to convey our bottom-line judgment of where a situation is heading. Inasmuch as the Intelligence Memorandum replaces both of these current products, there would be no artificial constraints on its length. This new product is expected, nevertheless, to be highly focused and used as the primary vehicle to serve policymakers' need for short deadline analysis. Those of today's Typescript Memorandums and Intelligence Assessments that are valued more for their informational content and broad perspective on an issue would be produced as Intelligence Research Papers which are discussed in a subsequent paragraph.

To enhance timeliness, the new Intelligence Memorandum would not be processed by CPAS but rather would be produced at the office level. That is, this publication would be released by the Office Director except in those instances when the Memorandum is designed for an audience at or above the Assistant Secretary level or when the Memorandum covers a particularly sensitive issue; those Intelligence Memorandums would be reviewed by the DDI/ADDI.

Inasmuch as Intelligence Memorandums will be issued by all the DI production offices, there is a need for special attention to quality control. The Task Force believes CPAS should be commissioned to design a distinctive "letterhead" for this product and should issue guidance on the format for the body of the report. Both of these measures should provide some continuity across the Directorate with regard to the physical appearance of the Intelligence Memorandum. CPAS should also be prepared to contribute page-size graphics for this product much more frequently than is now the case with the Typescript Memorandum. The Task Force strongly believes the continued use of such graphics is necessary to continue an aspect of DI papers that consumers particularly value. Finally, Office Directors would, as with intelligence products currently, be responsible for quality control of the substance of these Memorandums. The Task Force suggests that to assist in maintaining standards across the production offices that an informal working group of office research directors or other appropriate officials--chaired by the DI Product Evaluation Staff--meet frequently to discuss appropriate quality control issues.

The Task Force proposes to create another new product, the **Intelligence Research Paper**, to replace the current Research Paper, Reference Aid, Technical Intelligence Report and Imagery Analysis Report. The Intelligence Research Paper would be published in two parts. A **Key Findings** version of 2-3 printed pages would be disseminated to senior consumers, generally Assistant Secretaries and above. Given the audience, the Key Findings would be reviewed in draft by the DDI/ADDI. The full version of the Intelligence Research Paper would be reviewed at the office level except in those instances identified by the DDI/ADDI. This full version--with the Key Findings--would be made more widely available to "desk-level" officials. Recipients who receive only the Key Findings could, of course, request the full version of any Intelligence Research Paper that piques their interest. Both the Key Findings and the full version of the Intelligence Research Paper would be processed by CPAS.

The use of Key Findings would thus reduce the volume of material sent to senior consumers, whereas the dissemination

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of the full Intelligence Research Paper would preserve the key traditional DI product that provides consumers with a wealth of basic information often possessing a lengthy shelf life. Some papers would continue to be printed in "foldout" format, as wall charts and as data bases under the Intelligence Research Paper rubric but without separate Key Findings. Formal publication of the Intelligence Research Paper would continue to encourage essential data base building and basic research while helping to ensure rigor in the review of analysts' drafts. The prominence associated with such publication should reinforce the efforts of Career Service Panels to recognize those who make the investment in longer-term research as well as those who contribute via other products.

The Task Force proposes to retain the wide array of DI "non-traditional" or ad hoc products. These blind memorandums, situation reports and the like clearly meet an extremely broad range of key policymakers' needs in a timely fashion. The Task Force believes that a greater identification of these products as DI publications is appropriate, however. Here, too, a "letterhead" would provide some continuity across the Directorate and better signal these as DI products without detracting from their highly-focused and tailored nature. CPAS is prepared to design such a format.

Finally, the Task Force also discussed the serial publications--some of which are often referred to as staff notes--issued by most offices. These serials are relied on by a wide range of staff-level policy officers. They also serve as valuable training vehicles for new analysts and allow more experienced analysts to experiment with alternative lines of analysis. In many cases, however, they merely add to the volume of material shipped to consumers. The Task Force would charge each issuing office to revalidate the utility of these publications and to ensure that they are disseminated only to appropriate consumers.

The Task Force believes that these recommendations collectively provide the means to enhance the timeliness and policy relevance of DI products in part by providing an even more focused product and by streamlining the production process. It is difficult to estimate the resource savings, if any. The Task Force would expect that the volume of DI material processed by the printing plant would be reduced but at some additional expense to the offices issuing Intelligence Memorandums. The resource saving in CPAS would presumably be seen earliest in even faster turnaround time for those products still formally printed.

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RECOMMENDATIONS: That DI products be enhanced as described above, creating the Intelligence Memorandum and Intelligence Research Paper, the latter to be issued in two parts:- a Key Findings and the full text.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

#### DISSEMINATION

In addition to changing the number and type of DI products produced, the Task Force finds that increased attention to the timely and focused dissemination of DI products would enhance the value of DI analysis to individual consumers. This means both reducing the amount of nonrelevant material sent to consumers and ensuring that relevant analysis is made available when it is needed.

Consumer surveys indicate that Directorate analysts and managers are doing a lot of things right and, just as clearly, that more can be done to better serve individual consumers. The volume of material produced is formidable. In 1991, the DI disseminated an average of 52,000 copies of CPAS-produced finished intelligence products each month--a 100 percent increase since 1986. Included in this number are--on average--over 500 copies of each Intelligence Assessment, nearly 600 copies of each Research Paper, and almost 800 copies of each Reference Aid. Over half of these items were disseminated to internal, Agency consumers.

In the interest of executing our responsibilities to inform and warn appropriate policymakers, the Task Force sees some over-reaching in dissemination as acceptable and even welcome. The above figures, however, demonstrate that as a Directorate we need to more effectively review and pare dissemination lists.

More rapid dissemination of DI products also would be facilitated by developing procedures to reduce the often lengthy time required to gain Directorate of Operations clearance of ORCON documents used in sourcing papers. The Task Force looked into this cross-Directorate issue by examining the time required to gain clearance for ORCON material used in hardcover papers published by two DI offices in the past couple of years. We discovered that obtaining such clearances frequently requires more time than the time taken by CPAS to process and print the paper. The Task Force believes that the DI Product Evaluation Staff should be charged to do a more complete study of this issue

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and to collaborate with CPAS and appropriate DO offices to streamline clearance procedures.

The more focused dissemination of DI analysis is a more complex issue but boils down to closer contact with key consumers to ensure that DI analysis is relevant and timely. Those consumers who believe improvements need to be made see the DI as "too distant" and "too impersonal" in its delivery of intelligence. Even consumers who consider themselves well served are frequently unaware of the full range of support that the DI can deliver.

The DI currently employs a broad array of mechanisms to reach consumers. Agency liaison officers are assigned to organizations such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other organizations in the Pentagon and the military commands, the Office of the US Trade Representative and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. At other agencies--particularly the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Energy--Intelligence Offices include Agency representatives. These individuals have the advantage of frequent, often daily, contact with intelligence consumers and are privy to their current requirements. On the other hand, these officers cannot be expected to have the substantive expertise needed to more deeply probe consumers' needs, and they are not empowered to make on-the-spot resource commitments to satisfy consumer requests.

Other approaches used by various DI offices to reach consumers include, in addition to regular meetings with at least some consumers:

- Identification of a marketing specialist to ensure that papers and briefings reach appropriate consumers.
- Regular attendance at the consumers' staff meetings.
- Periodic circulation to potential consumers of a flier listing recent publications on a particular geographic area.
- Use of the IEEW and office staff notes to alert readers to other recent publications.

Given the broad range of consumers served by the DI and the differences between offices in the ways analysis is delivered, the Task Force believes it inappropriate to devise a set of hard-and-fast rules regarding dissemination for application across the Directorate. Rather the Task Force would charge each DI office to develop a formal action

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plan for review by the DDI/ADDI with the common objective to better disseminate each office's analysis. The Task Force believes that such plans should contain some common themes, however, over and above the periodic scrubbing of dissemination lists, such as:

- Tailored briefings by DI analysts and managers should be used more frequently to highlight key intelligence findings.
- Analysts and managers alike should be required to know their principal consumers' interests and intelligence needs. This would include knowing the preferences of consumers regarding briefings or written product.
- Discussion of the specific target audience should be included in concept sessions for individual products, and concept papers for hardcover research projects should clearly reflect active canvassing of key policymakers' views and interests.
- Efforts to reach key consumers should be addressed in a Key Job Element on PARs for both analysts and managers and performance in this regard elaborated upon in the narrative section of the PAR.
- DI offices should create more frequent opportunities for policy officials and analysts to participate in symposia, short seminars or other forums where issues can be debated.
- DI offices should be more aggressive in the use of liaison staffs to disseminate DI products, specifically to assess policymaker requirements as they develop and to ensure that key papers and briefings are presented to appropriate decisionmakers.
- Selected DI offices should consider the assignment of office representatives to key Assistant Secretaries at particularly important policy agencies, such as the State Department.
- To the maximum extent possible, offices should strive to disseminate their products at the Secret level or below to reach more working level officials.
- Offices should consider other dissemination devices such as periodically providing consumers



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lists of products they can request. Moreover, to facilitate contact with consumers, requests for papers should be made to the producing office not, as is currently the case, to CPAS.

The Task Force also discussed increasing the number of liaison officers assigned to consumer agencies and creating liaison "circuit riders" who would be based at CIA Headquarters but regularly visit key consumers to deliver DI products. In principle, the Task Force believes that the enhanced dissemination efforts of the DI offices would better serve the Directorate's purposes. The office-based efforts will ensure that consumers are engaged by analysts and managers who are prepared to discuss substantive issues and who are able to make resource commitments on-the-spot. The Task Force believes it worthwhile to more expressly----- examine whether or not current liaison staffs are sufficiently supported and would charge the DI Management, Plans and Support Staff and CPAS to make such a study. The Task Force found convincing the plea by at least some liaison officers that--even if their numbers are not increased--they be provided with the essential tools necessary to function effectively: chiefly secure communications and, when possible, computer connectivity to Headquarters. The Task Force would likewise charge MPSS, CPAS and the Office of Information Resources to reevaluate the availability of such facilities.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** That the DDI direct DI offices to prepare action plans as discussed above and that liaison officers be supported as appropriate.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

#### MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION

The proposed enhancements to DI production combined with more aggressive efforts to interact with the consumers of DI analysis will be perceived by many managers and analysts--perhaps to a greater extent than is actually the case--as a change of emphasis and direction in the DI's working culture. The Task Force believes that attention needs to be paid to managing the proposed changes and the associated uncertainties and unease. Much of this change will center on how to value, recognize and reward efforts to interact with consumers and briefing abilities as well as the ability to prepare written analysis either in the form

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of long-term research or the preparation of material under short deadline.

By their nature, these kinds of issues are less susceptible to specific, near-term recommendations. Accordingly, the Task Force has tried to identify some of the key issues regarding management in the proposed DI production environment and the appropriate training needed for DI analysts and managers and to educate DI consumers.

Early on, the Task Force believes the Directorate should develop a statement of principles regarding the need for greater outreach and interaction with the policymaking community. This statement also should seek to articulate the major standards and criteria for the new intelligence products and formats. Especially important, in the Task Force's view, is a reiteration of Directorate expectations regarding quality control and presentation of a fully coordinated, corporate voice--necessary in any movement toward more-tailored presentations to policymakers, especially featuring an increase in the number of briefings. Directorate-wide coordination will be particularly important to avoid redundant dissemination efforts and to ensure that closer coordination with policymakers does not lead to politicization of our analysis. These factors will require an even more corporate approach by senior managers in each DI office. Thus, the Task Force encourages managers to develop forums for periodic exchanges on key substantive issues which cut across office or center boundaries. The purpose of these meetings would be to discuss ways to maximize the efficient use of our human and technological resources. Concomitantly, guidance should be developed for the DI career service panels to ensure that efforts to increase interaction with consumers are included in the criteria by which DI analysts at different grade levels are evaluated.

The Task Force believes care must be taken to preserve the DI research base and to provide appropriate rewards for analysts involved in this essential effort. Managing this research effort and the review process will continue to be of major concern to senior DI officers to ensure the appropriate level of effort on key issues and to maintain control over quality. To these ends, some type of published research agenda will be necessary, and the Task Force recommends that preparation and publication of the annual Program of Analysis be continued, although it may be more appropriate to emphasize research themes rather than to identify specific papers.

The Task Force recommends that a follow-on working group be established to alter or develop new DI-OTE courses

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for DI analysts and managers to assure they have the writing, organizational, briefing, and management skills needed in the future. Among its duties, this group should consider adding training units as appropriate to core courses--such as the Analysis Training Course, briefing techniques workshops, the Reaching Policymakers Course, Supervision of Analysis and middle level manager seminars--and creating new courses for analysts beyond or just leaving their three-year probationary period. This follow-on working group should also consider courses or seminars for officials from policy agencies to enable them to gain greater familiarity with CIA.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** That the DDI consider the preparation of a Directorate-level statement of principles regarding enhanced outreach to the policymaking community and coordination guidelines for DI analytical products, the provision of general guidance for DI career panels, and the establishment of a follow-on DI-OTE working group to develop appropriate new OTE courses or additions to current courses for analysts and managers and for consumers to familiarize them with CIA.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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18 November 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Intelligence Production

1. I would like for you to appoint a task force to examine ways in which we can change our approach to the production of analysis. This task force should examine different forms of conveying intelligence analysis to the policymaker and how to increase the value and reduce the volume of intelligence provided to policy consumers. Further, this task force should look at creating new products and procedures that build and maintain an intelligence base without necessarily having formally to publish through an extensive publications process.

2. I would like to have your report, options and recommendations on these issues by 15 January 1992.



Robert M. Gates

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DCI Task Force on Intelligence Production

Chairman: [ ] Director 25X1  
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis

Executive Secretary: [ ] Research Director 25X1  
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis

Members:

[ ] Chief, Trade Issues Branch 25X1  
Office of Resources, Trade and Technology

[ ] Behavioral Analyst 25X1  
Political Psychology Division  
Office of Leadership Analysis

[ ] Deputy Chief, Domestic and Foreign Policy 25X1  
Group, Republics Division, Office of Slavic and Eurasian  
Analysis

[ ] Chief, Leadership & Career Development Division 25X1  
Office of Training and Education

[ ] Deputy Director 25X1  
Office of African and Latin American Analysis

[ ] Chief, Economic Issues Division 25X1  
Office of Resources, Trade and Technology

[ ] Chief, Cartography Center 25X1  
Cartography, Design, and Publishing Group  
Office of Current Production and Analytic Support

[ ] Chief, Africa Branch 25X1  
Office of Leadership Analysis

[ ] Deputy Chief, Production Support Division 25X1  
Office of Imagery Analysis

[ ] Chief, German Branch 25X1  
Office of European Analysis

[ ] Chief, Defensive Systems Division 25X1  
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research

[ ] Deputy Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center 25X1

[ ] Deputy Chief 25X1  
Cartography, Design, and Publishing Group  
Office of Current Production and Analytic Support

[ ] Chief, Product Evaluation Staff 25X1

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## DCI Task Force on Intelligence Production

### Associated Issues

During the Task Force deliberations several issues were tabled that, although not directly applicable to the charge given the Task Force, will affect the future environment in which the DI will function. Some of these issues are briefly noted here; some are more immediate than others, but most will no doubt need to be considered in formulating the DCI response to the intelligence information and support needs of policymaking agencies in the year 2005 required by National Security Review 29. [REDACTED]

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Factors--some likely, some possible--that could affect how DI products are produced and disseminated in the future include:

- A Change in Administration. Changes in the Administration could result in different consumers and shifts in international priorities. The need for more basic and background information about the countries and issues we follow would increase.
- Changes in Other Intelligence Agencies. Likely contractions in the analytic capabilities for other intelligence agencies could require the DI to assume new areas of responsibility and engage in more inter-agency production.
- Technological Improvements. New technologies could accelerate a trend towards electronic dissemination and inter-agency data bases. Even current technology could allow DI analysts to work increasingly from the field to produce current intelligence on fast breaking events.
- A Maturing Work Force. The DI's maturing analytic work force will require less emphasis on developing basic skills, while enabling more sophisticated, policy-support analysis. This work force also will likely generate more demands for the delegation of responsibilities and authority to "match" acquired skills and expertise.

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- Demands for Less Classification. Pressure for downgrading the classification of both finished and raw intelligence are likely to grow if the counter-intelligence threat wanes and the Directorate does more on economic competitiveness. [REDACTED]

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The Task Force believes these changes and pressures are likely to require an ever more corporate approach by the senior managers in DI offices. Thus, the Task Force encourages managers to develop forums for periodic exchanges on key substantive issues which cut across office or center boundaries. The purpose of these meetings would be to discuss ways to maximize the efficient use of our human and technological resources. [REDACTED]

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As noted above, the Task Force believes that these longer-term issues will be especially important in light of National Security Review 29. As part of this reexamination of future intelligence requirements, the Task Force believes the DI will need to focus greater attention on the developing trends in the dissemination of large volumes of open-source data increasingly available in the age of world-wide computer services. Certainly by 2005, policymakers will be relying on much more customized and immediate access to basic information and analysis on issues of concern to them. Much of this information and analysis could be provided on demand by commercial information services exploiting global electronic computer networks that allow rapid collection, correlation, and analysis of information. To remain competitive through 2005, the Task Force believes that the Directorate will need to adapt to this developing global information and analysis environment. Policymakers will expect from us the same speed, accuracy and responsiveness that they will have become accustomed to receiving from openly-available global database networks. To meet these challenges, the DI will have to look carefully at its anticipated budgets through the remainder of this decade to acquire and develop the technologies and human analytical capabilities that will be needed--and expected--by the policy community at the opening of the 21st century. [REDACTED]

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